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BRITAIN'S POLICE IN WAR
Sir Philip Game
(The author, Sir Philip Game, has had strategic opportunity to view the
impact of war on crime and policing and to direct police efforts in preserving
the peace during one of the most critical periods in world history. As head of
one of the world's largest police departments-that of Metropolitan Londonand one which has been faced with the holocaust of total war, his observations
on the scope and direction of problems facing the police in wartime and the
possible direction of enforcement difficulties after the war are of exceptional
and timely interest. He brings to bear the fruits of long experience in world
affairs. He served in the British Army in World War I, when he was awarded
the distinguished Service Order. Commanded the R.A.F. in India, 1922-23 and
was Air Member for Personnel on the Air Council, 1923-28. Retired in 1929
when Air Vice Marshal, and became Governor of New South Wales, Australia,
1930-35. Since 1935 he has served as Commissioner of Police for the Metropo11s-Erron.)

How war would affect each one of us as individuals, the policeman just as much as anyone else, we in Britain could only guess.

But looking forward beforehand it seemed probable that the war
work of British Police Forces in their corporate capacity would remain within the wide limits set at all times by the protection of
life and property and the maintenance of public order. This is what
has happened and any changes that have taken place have been
relative rather than absolute.
The bases of Britain's police organization to meet the conditions
of war were twofold. We had to aim first and foremost at a flexible
organization which, while it would provide for concentration on
war work, to the exclusion if necessary of ordinary duties, would
equally facilitate the performance of those duties during periods
of comparative quiet. Secondly flexibility demanded a wide delegation of responsibility. Local officers had each in his own sphere
to consider all the many and various problems which might arise
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in localities as dissimilar as Manchester, centre of the industrial
North, and Margate, popular sea-side resort, and to lay their plans
on the basis of heavily damaged communications and consequent
lack of higher control.
In addition, the police had to make contact and arrange cooperation with the various Civil Defense Services, some of which,
like the Wardens Service, were new ventures altogether, and to get
a clear picture of where reports should and should not (to avoid
congestion) be sent, to whom sufferers and enquirers should be
directed, how wide an area must be evacuated for many diverse
types of time bomb, how to obtain assistance quickly from the
various public utility services and so on almost ad infinitum.
A good deal is asked of the ordinary British police officer in
peace time. He is expected to be not only a man of resource, courtesy, self-reliance and courage, but also a walking encyclopedia of
miscellaneous information. But war imposes new restrictions, set
out and defined in numerous and lengthy Acts, Orders and Regulations, and each creates new offenses. There seemed therefore' a
real danger of the police officer getting bogged in a morass of complicated instructions. But it was difficult to keep the number down,
for modern life, especially in large cities, is so highly developed and
organized that any serious disturbance of it gives rise to a great
variety of complications and the police, who are relied upon to
straighten out many of the resulting difficulties need to have a vast
amount of information-whether in their heads or ready to handto enable them to take the right action or give the right advice.
When heavy bombing started it created entirely new situations
for the ordinary citizen as well, who often found himself suddenly
faced with a state of affairs-ranging from acute tragedy to mere
inconvenience-against which he had been able to make little provision in advance. Looking for help he naturally turned to the
familiar police officer who, while the newly formed Civil Defense
Forces were finding their feet, which they did surprisingly quickly,
lent a ready hand as needed without worrying whose job it was on
paper.
Another temporary effect of the war on police was a reduction
in numbers of regular men on long engagements. Some police officers were reservists of the Armed Forces and were called up automatically on mobilization. Many others volunteered at the earliest
opportunity. But there could be practically no new intake owing
to general liability to military service, while the normal wastage
due to sickness, accident and death would continue to deplete police
strength. The acceptance of volunteers for military service had
therefore to be controlled and, even when the control was lightened,
was confined to specified categories. Large numbers of police volunteered for these categories which included the Navy, parachute
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units flying duties. For the latter alone some 4,000 regular officers
have been accepted out of a total strength of under 70,000, of which
only those under 32 were eligible to volunteer. This figure compares favorably-with that for any other occupation. During the
early years of the war regular police apart from these volunteers
were not called up for the Armed Forces, but as the demands for
man-power for the Fighting Services increased this reservation
was progressively removed and all fit men under 30 were eventually
transferred.
To meet the prospective wastage from all causes on the outbreak
of war, large numbers of men were asked to accept the liability to
be enrolled as auxiliary police constables on mobilization and to fit
themselves for this by undergoing a short course of training in
peace in police duties connected with the protection of life and the
maintenance of public order. The response was excellent and the
services of these men and of the old established Special Constabulary have proved of the greatest value, not only in connection with
air raids, but also, as time gave them experience, in nearly every
branch of police work. These Auxiliaries like the Regulars have
gradually been transferred in increasingly large numbers from
police work to the Armed Forces and essential industries.
From the point of view of crime the war has made but little
change. The annual sum of indictable crimes has varied but little
from pre-war years, and what variation has occurred has been
mainly downwards. The great bulk of crime in Britain consists of
burglary, house and shop breakings and stealing of all kinds, and
the first three taken together show a small increase. It is to be
feared that the fact that the increase has not been greater is less
likely to be due to any access of honesty than to longer hours of
work, higher wages and lack of opportunity. A noticeable feature
is that over 50 per cent of detected crimes of the four classes above
are committed by persons under 21. This was -a feature of pre-war
years, but the percentage has risen during the war, due no doubt
to children and young persons under 17 having more freedom from
parental control now that their parents are all working and to
their not being at work themselves.
Work, restricted traveling facilities, the blackout, the remarkably good behavior of the mass or troops, British, Dominion,
Colonial and Allied, congregated in Britain-the wonderful spirit
with which the air raids have been met by everyone and everywhere, and a completely united and nation-wide determination to
win the war have all combined to make the maintenance of public
order a far simpler task for Britain's police than in days of greater
individual freedom and less unity of purpose.
The same causes, especially the facing of difficulties and dangers
together, have accentuated the good feeling between the public and
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the police which has always been a feature of British life and this
it may be hoped will probably prove to be the most permanent effect of the war on the police system.
So far we have been looking back with experience as our guide.
Looking forward is more difficult and we have to rely on conjecture. What then may Britain expect in the post-war years, and
what changes and development appear likely? We can perhaps
discount the growing pains and teething troubles incidental to the
change over from a war to a peace footing. They will probably
keep our police forces, all reduced in strength, busy; but we are
considering more permanent developments, not temporary and
passing adjustments in our system of policing.
War does not create new problems. Even within its own technique it is not the principles of strategy which have to be reviewed
but their application. What war does is to focus general attention
on problems recognized hitherto by the few as urgent, but relegated
by the many to some more convenient future. War stimulates
thought-questions existing theories, beliefs and organizationsand increases the tempo of social change and technical development.
In considering, therefore, the possible effects of this world
war on police science (for policing is a science) it may be wise to
begin by asking ourselves what tendencies towards change and
development were already discernible before war came upon us.
Their causes are probably to be sought for in the evolution of an
altered social outlook and in technical advances, especially in communication, transport and education.
The British police system has from the remotest times been
based on the responsibility of every citizen for the maintenance of
law and order. In early days when Britain was an agricultural
community the Saxon institutions of Frankpledge and Hue and
Cry carried this principle to its logical conclusion, and it was only
when the coming of the Industrial Revolution introduced a profound change in social conditions that this direct and simple
system failed to meet the needs of the times. After much trial
and error, more argument and a period of increasing social disorder, the modern police were created by Peel. And they were
organized pre-eminently to deal with the twin evils rampant at
the time of violence and robbery, both encouraged by cheap drink.
These crimes took place in the ill-lighted or unlighted streets and
alleys and the system of beats and patrols was the natural outcome. In the last 30 years or so, both violence and drink have
decreased to such an extent that violent crime is now a very small
proportion indeed of the whole and drink a very minor cause of
crime compared with a hundred years ago. Yet fundamentally
there have been few changes in the methods of maintaining law
and order so successfully evolved by Peel. As in the case of
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strategy, Peel's principles are as sound as ever; it is in their application that an overhaul, if any, is needed.
Modern statistical methods give a very good picture of the
geographical distribution of the commonest forms of crime and a
fairly good indication of the hours of the day or night during
which the majority of them are committed. Crime prevention can
therefore be organized on a more flexible and scientific basis and
the available man power can be applied as, when and where it is
wanted in better accord with the actual needs. Motor transport
and rapid communications favor this. Two of the unchanging
principles of military science are the need of being strong at the
decisive point and the use of reserves, and these can now be applied
to crime prevention.
But what types of crime are Britain's post-war police most
likely to be called upon to prevent? Can we expect any major
changes in this respect?
If we achieve a greater measure of social security, may we not
look for a diminution of the types of crime which are so largely the
result of poverty and want?
If we achieve as well the improvements in education, which
are being so urgently demanded and sought, may we not also hope
for less crime due to ignorance, futility and false values in our
outlook on life?
But there is another class of crime more subtle and more
difficult to deal with than the robbery and violence of Peel's day or
the house and shop breaking and petty thieving of all kinds which
is so rife at present. It is not a new phenomenon but has always
confronted those charged with law enforcement with perhaps their
most difficult problem. A broad definition of it is the exploitation
of the community for private gain and it would include such crimes
as blackmail, fraud, forgery, share-pushing, embezzlement and
the confidence trick. More and more in recent years has public
opinion come to regard this as the vilest type of crime and the
demand for its suppression will inevitably grow and, as always,
will be difficult to meet. These crimes cannot be prevented by the
vigilance of the uniformed police officer in the streets. In the
great majority of cases they can only be dealt with and discouraged by subsequent detection.
Apart from what is usually accepted as crime, police after the
war will certainly be faced once again and probably to a greater
extent than before, with the almost impossible task of trying to
reduce the annual butcher's bill on our roads. Perhaps the greatest
difficulty in dealing with road accidents is that they are not,
except to a very limited extent, caused by criminal behavior but
simply by over confidence, carelessness, and want of thought and,
in the case of the pedestrian, just sheer forgetfulness.
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Viewing the problem as a whole we may then, perhaps, expect
the following tendencies to manifest themselves in post-war police
work.
First the need for a more flexible system than the somewhat
rigid one of beat and patrol, which in the attempt to be strong ran
the danger of being weak everywhere. For a greater concentration, for instance, of uniformed police in the built-up areas, both
business and residential, at the dangerous hours, to deal with
housebreaking and shopbreaking, offset by a smaller number of
men, equipped with motor transport, in the sparsely populated
districts which were the haunt of highwayman and footpad in
earlier days.
Second, an increase in the detective side to cope with exploitation, criminal or semi-criminal, in all its forms.
And third, a return to at least pre-war activity in connection
with the control of traffic and the prevention of road accidents.
Finally, and most important, successful police work will more
and more need the ready co-operation and assistance of the public.
The British citizen, in spite of his insistence on personal liberty,
recognizes that this is possible only so long as public order is
maintained. He is, therefore, neither inclined to break the peace
himself, nor to stand idly by and see others do so, and a British
crowd well handled seldom gives the police trouble, however worked
up its feelings may be. But the corollary of the cult of personal
liberty is a distaste for interferring in other people's business and
this, combined no doubt with an easily understood dislike of hanging about a police court even as a witness, very seriously restricts
the assistance the public give the police in their fight with crime.
It is the same with road accidents, but the position is even
worse because the toll of the roads has completely failed to touch
the public conscience in spite of much propaganda.
But the assistance of the public is more and more needed. The
professional criminal of today is no longer the Bill Sykes type
of violent rufflaif. The police today are up against brain rather
than brawn, and the criminal has most, if not all, the facilities
of transport and communication they have themselves. To defeat
him the police need above everything information, and that quickly.
This applies to crime prevention equally with detection. The
uniformed policeman in the street cannot be everywhere, but nowadays he can be anywhere in a very few minutes, provided he gets
the information on which to act. Again, however inspired the
detective, he must have something to go upon. As he says himself, detective work is "10 per cent inspiration and 90 per cent
perspiration" and the perspiration is largely the result of following up lines of inquiry suggested by information.
Even now facilities for giving information to the police are
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widely available with very little trouble to the informant, and
the development of the wireless telephone during the war is likely
to make communication even more easy. It is to be hoped the
public will learn to use the facilities provided to their full extent,
for, however widely and on whatever lines police science may
develop, capture redhanded is the exception and information the
far more common starting point of success. Perhaps the closer
touch between Police and public engendered by the war will help
the latter to see the need for their assistance and encourage them
to give it in full measure.
What of the Policeman himself-the man who does the work?
The outstanding feature of his job is its individual character.
Whatever the supervision provided, the police officer works alone
for some 59 minutes out of every 60, and the efficiency and success
of the machine depends almost entirely on his loyalty and self-discipline, initiative, resourcefulness, knowledge of the law and, perhaps
even more, of human nature. This has always been and will always
be so. It is a great deal to ask of any man, especially of one
peculiarly exposed to temptation, and it is futile to expect it of a
man who is discontented with his lot.
In post-war years, therefore, the policeman's conditions of service must not only keep pace with but move in advance of a general
rise in the standard of life. This will not be easy and needs a deal
of careful thought, for though the policeman cannot altogether
dispense with brawn, brainy criminals postulate brainy police and
the better educated the recruit accepted for police service, the more
he will look for a real career with prospects of advancement for
himself and of a sound education and good start in life for his
children.
The advancement for himself is the real difficulty. In a police
force it is the constables who cover the ground and it has hitherto
been accepted that large numbers are needed to do so thoroughly,
especially in cities constantly expanding in size and population.
But additional constables do not necessarily entail additional Sergeants still less increases in the higher ranks. The promotion
curve in the police service is consequently flat and is likely to
become more so rather than improve unless changes in methods of
policing reduce the need for numbers in the lowest rank. But
change must be found if the right type of recruit for the police
service is to be attracted and his keenness and interest maintained.
Napoleon said that an Army of asses led by a lion would always
defeat an Army of lions led by an ass, but however true this may
have been of an Army in his days, it would be very dangeroMs to
accept it as true of a police force today.

